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Abstract
This paper empirically examines whether devoting more resources to educa-
tion can reduce the size of the shadow economy on a cross-section of countries.
The findings show a negative relationship between public education expendi-
ture and the size of the shadow economy, which is robust to the inclusion of
different proxies for the control variables, a large set of policy variables and
regional differences. The findings also suggest that an increase in educational
attainment can reduce the size of the shadow economy.
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1. Introduction
Each year there are an enormous number of economic transactions in
the market which are not deliberately revealed to the public authorities.
This phenomenon is known as shadow economy. According to the empirical
evidence, the shadow economy has reached remarkable proportions with a
weighted average size (as a percentage of GDP) of almost 40 percent in Sub-
Saharan African countries, about 35 percent in mostly transition countries
and 13.5 percent in high-income OECD countries (Schneider et al., 2010).
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow
economy on the basis of the model developed by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). In this model tax evasion is negatively correlated with the probability
of detection and the degree of punishment. Despite the strong focus on
deterrence in policies fighting the shadow economy activities, the empirical
evidence is really limited, because it is very difficulty to get data about who
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is engaged in these activities, the frequencies with which these activities
are occurring and the magnitude of them. The main results demonstrate
that fines and punishment do not exert a negative influence on the shadow
economy. However, these results are often weak and causality tests show that
the size of the shadow economy can impact deterrence instead of deterrence
reducing the shadow economy (Andreoni et al., 1998; Feldet al., 2009).
Differently, there is by now a rich empirical literature that investigates
the relationship between the size of the shadow economy and a set of causal
variables. Inadequate and slow economic growth rates, high unemployment
rates, high marginal tax rates and high level of public consumption have been
identified as the main driving forces of the shadow economy (Schneider et al.,
2000; Dell’Anno et al., 2003; Marinov, 2008; Bovi et al., 2009; Cicek et al.,
2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Torgler et al., 2010). In particular, these studies
show a positive correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the
government expenditure. The plausible interpretation of this result is that if
the government spending does not satisfy the public preferences (for example,
in presence of unnecessary or irrational government spending), then the tax
payers are disappointed with the government and search for other options,
such as engaging in shadow economy activities. Another interpretation of
the positive sign of this coefficient gives support to the hypothesis that more
State in the market, and subsequently an increase in regulation, incentives
to operate in the unofficial economy (Dell’Anno et al., 2003). However, since
government must allocate scarce resources among various priorities (defence,
education, infrastructure, etc.), it would be important to better understand
if this positive relationship is robust to the various components of the public
expenditure. More recently, there is a growing empirical evidence on the
nexus between education and shadow economy, but these studies demonstrate
mixed results. Torgler (2004) find a positive correlation between education
and the size of the shadow economy in Switzerland, but they define this
result as surprising, because the expected sign was negative. Ge¨rxhani et al.
(2013) find a negative correlation between shadow economy and education
in the urban area of Tirana. Buehn et al. (2013) show that higher levels of
education have positive effects on the shadow economy in an environment of
weak political institutions.
In this context, the aim of this paper is to better ascertain the impact of
the public education expenditure on the size of the shadow economy. In more
details, the paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, the
paper examines whether devoting more resources to education can negatively
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affect the size of the shadow economy using a cross-section of 70 countries.
Secondly, the paper identifies what level of education (primary, secondary or
higher) implies a decreasing effect on the shadow economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
presents the empirical model. Section 3 reports the findings and Section
4 concludes.
2. Data and empirical specification
Data on the size of the shadow economy come from the data set deve-
loped by Schneider et al. (2010), that is the largest existing data set on the
size and trends of the shadow economy in 162 countries over the period 1999
to 2006/2007. In Schneider et al. (2010) the shadow economy is defined as
the production of all market-based legal goods and services that are delibe-
rately concealed from public authorities for any of the following reasons:
(i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; (ii) to avoid
payment of social security contributions; (iii) to avoid having to meet certain
legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages maximum working
hours, safety standards, etc.; (iv) to avoid complying with certain admi-
nistrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other
administrative forms. Schneider et al. (2010) use the macroeconomic multiple
indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model to estimate the size of the shadow
economy.
The level of public education expenditure has been used to capture the
intensity of support for public education in a country. Data on the public
education expenditure levels come from the World Bank Database (World
Bank, 2012).
In order to study the effect of public education spending on the shadow
economy, the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression is carried out. In more
details, the empirical specification is constructed as follows. Let SSE denote
the size of the shadow economy, measured in percentage of GDP, then I
regress SSE upon the log of the public education expenditure level, denoted
as LGEE:
SSEi = β0 + β1LGEEi+ i (1)
where i is the stochastic error term.
Furthermore, in order to capture both the quantity and quality effect of
education, I regress SSE upon LGEE and a matrix X of education variables
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as follows:
SSEi = α + βLGEEi + γXi + i (2)
Matrix X is comprised of a set of three variables that capture the quality
of education. These variables are the percentage of primary, secondary and
higher education attainment in the adult population (PRI, SEC, HIGH).
Data for these variables come from Barro and Lee (2010).
Finally, I regress SSE upon LGEE, the matrix X and a matrix Y as
follows:
SSEi = α + βLGEEi + γXi + δYi + i (3)
Matrix Y includes a set of control variables, which are the main determi-
nants of the shadow economy previously identified in literature. This set
includes: GDP per capita, taxation and government effectiveness. Data on
GDP per capita and taxation come from the World Bank Database (World
Bank, 2012), whereas data on government effectiveness come from Kaufmann
et al. (2010).
Finally, variables capturing macroeconomic conditions, income distribu-
tion, political stability and openness have been included for the robustness
checks.
The sample consists of 70 observations on the latest year for which the
shadow economy and education data are both available, namely 2005. The
sample includes 34 countries from high-income group, 29 countries from
middle-income group and 7 countries from low-income group. The lack of
a larger sample size is caused by a lack of consistent and available data for
many countries in the period of investigation. In Appendix, Tables A1 and
A2 report more details concerning, respectively, the list of countries and
summary statistics.
3. Results
To get a first insight Figure 1 plots the relationship between the size of
the shadow economy, corrected for GDP versus public education expenditure
(transformed in logarithmic terms). The scatter plot suggests a negative
association. Furthermore, as specified in Equation (1), Table 1 shows the
results of the bivariate regression (1.1) and confirms that the coefficient upon
the log of the public education expenditure is negative.
[Figure 1 about here]
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[Table 1 about here]
As it remains unclear as to whether the public expenditure variable is
capturing a quantity or quality effect of education, three variables related to
education level have been added as specified in Equation (2). The results of
the multivariate regression (1.2), reported in Table 1, confirm the negative
sign for the coefficient related to the public education expenditure variable,
but also they show that an increase in educational attainment significantly
reduces the size of the shadow economy. Following the lead of the literature
on the impacts of education on crime (Lochner, 2004; Lochner et al., 2004;
Machinet al., 2011), a plausible interpretation of these results is that through
its positive effect on income returns, education should reduce the incentives
to participate in the shadow economy, as taking on an official, well-paid job
becomes more rewarding, hence attractive. This may be referred to as the
human capital effect of education.
Furthermore, a set of three control variables, previously identified as the
main driving forces of the shadow economy in literature, have been added as
specified in Equation (3). These control variables include: GDP per capita,
direct taxation and government effectiveness. The GDP per capita is an
indicator of economic development. If on the one side, a downturn in the
economic official activities may lead to a loss of jobs and thus drive more
individuals into the hidden economy; on the other side, a contraction in the
GDP may reduce the demand for underground products and thus offset the
first effect. However, empirical evidence gives support to the hypothesis of
negative relation between shadow economy and GDP per capita. The most
popular determinants of tax evasion and of the shadow economy are tax rates.
In literature, the common hypothesis is that an increase of the tax burden is
a strong incentive to work in the unofficial economy and, hence, the expected
sign is positive. Here, the direct tax burden is measured by means of the total
share of direct tax as a percentages of GDP. Government effectiveness reflects
the perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil ser-
vice and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to such policies. The index ranges from -2.5 (weak) to
2.5 (strong) governance performance. The expected sign is negative.
The results of the multivariate regression (1.3) show that the selected
control variables exhibit the predicted sign. A larger per capita GDP and
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government effectiveness are associated with a smaller shadow economy. The
higher the direct tax share on GDP the higher is the incentive to work in the
shadow economy. The result of interest, however, pertains to education. The
relationship between the size of the shadow economy and public education
expenditure remains negative and statistically significant. The coefficients
of primary and secondary attainment become positive, but the coefficient of
higher attainment remains negative. This means that higher education levels
discourages the participation to the shadow economy activities.
4. Robustness checks
This section investigates the robustness of the above findings by three
tests.
Firstly, a set of six variables have been added to the specification (1.3),
which capture macroeconomic conditions, openness, income distribution and
political stability. This set includes: unemployment rate, currency, inflation
rate, trade, political stability index and income inequality. Unemployment
rate refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for
and seeking employment. As most shadow economy activities are reflected
in an additional use of cash (or currency), the currency outside the banks
as a proportion of base money has been used as monetary indicator. The
inflation rate is used as a proxy of macroeconomic instability. It is measured
by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator and shows the rate
of price change in the economy as a whole. Trade is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.
Political stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, in-
cluding politically motivated violence and terrorism; the index ranges from
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. The Gini
coefficient has been used as measure of income inequality. On the basis of
empirical evidence, the expected sign of the impact on the size of the shadow
economy is negative for the political stability index and positive for the use
of currency and income inequality; the effects of the inflation rate, trade
and unemployment rate are ambiguous. Data on government stability come
from Kaufmann et al. (2010), whereas data on the other variables come from
the World Bank Database (World Bank, 2012). The multivariate regression
is reported in Table 2. The results show a strikingly consistent pattern of
the education and control variables with the specification (1.3). Currency,
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political stability and income inequality exhibit the expected sign. Public
education expenditure, government effectiveness and income inequality are
statistically significant and the F test indicates that the estimated coefficients
are jointly significant.
[Table 2 about here]
Since one may be concerned that the findings was driven by the specific
set of proxies used in the specification (1.3), table 3 shows the results of
the robustness checks including the substitution of the education and control
variables by other indicators. In more details, I replace the log of public edu-
cation expenditure with two variables expenditure per student in secondary
and tertiary schooling level (specification 3.1); the educational attainment
levels (primary, secondary and higher) with no schooling and the average
schooling years (specification 3.2); direct tax as percentage of GDP with log
of direct tax revenues per capita (specification 3.3); government effective-
ness with the size of the government (specification 3.4). The results are very
similar amongst the regressions. Public education expenditure exhibits a
negative sign and its order is remarkable stable across regressions. In speci-
fication (3.1) the education expenditure per student decreases the size of the
shadow economy for the highest schooling level. Substitution of the educa-
tion attainment levels with the average schooling years confirms the human
capital effect of education: an increase in average education level reduces
the size of the shadow economy. In summary, the findings are robust to the
definition of control variables.
Finally, in specification (3.5), the model checks for regional differences
using dummies to reduce the omitted variables bias. The results show a posi-
tive sign both for middle and low income countries. Although the dummies
variables are not significant, we can consider the results as robust, as the F
test indicates that the estimated coefficients are jointly significant.
[Table 3 about here]
5. Conclusions
This article provides a first attempt to measure the impact of the public
education expenditure on the size of the shadow economy.
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Using a cross-section of 70 countries for the year 2005, the findings show a
negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and the public
education expenditure. The empirical results appear to be robust to different
proxies of the control variables, a large set of policy variables and regional
differences.
The policy implications of this paper are that support for education is
beneficial not only for raising the human capital to spur economic growth.
In fact, these results emphasize the role of education suggesting that policies
designed to increase educational attainment levels can reduce the size of the
shadow economy. Intuitively, these results may be interpreted in two ways.
First, as education increases wage rates, it increases the opportunity costs
of participating to shadow economy activities. Second, education may affect
on the social and moral dynamics and, hence, it may increase tax moral in
the individuals influencing (positively) their willingness to pay taxes.
In order to provide to policy-makers a better understanding of the nexus
between education and shadow economy, future research should focus on
different case studies in various geographical regions at the micro level.
APPENDIX
[Table A1 about here]
[Table A2 about here]
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Figure 1. Shadow economy vs. public education expenditure
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Table 1. Least square regressions, dependent variable: size of the shadow economy (% of GDP).
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3)
Const. 57.419 51.934 52.628
(18.86)*** (13.67)*** (5.56)***
Log of Public education expenditure -3.759 -2.249 -1.569
(10.34)*** (2.76)*** (1.99)**
Primary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.049 0.068
(0.59) (0.84)
Secondary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.079 0.041
(1.27) (0.63)
Higher school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.216 -0.011
(2.07)*** (0.10)
Log of GDP per capita -3.436
(1.16)
Direct tax (% of GDP) 0.064
(0.32)
Government effectiveness -4.606
(2.42)**
N 70 70 70
F 106.98*** 29.14*** 23.42***
R
2
0.611 0.642 0.726
Adj. R
2
0.605 0.619 0.695
* Statistically significant at the 10% level
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
* Statistically significant at the 1% level
Absolute t -statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 2. Least square regressions, dependent variable: size of the shadow economy (% of GDP).
(2.1)
Const. 40.706
(3.79)***
Log of Public education expenditure -1.647
(1.71)*
Primary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) 0.066
(0.79)
Secondary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) 0.069
(0.96)
Higher school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.031
(0.28)
Log of GDP per capita -2.139
(0.64)
Direct tax (% of GDP) 0.063
(0.31)
Government effectiveness -4.903
(1.99)*
Unemployment -0.247
(1.29)
Currency 0.004
(0.82)
Inflation -0.163
(0.95)
Openness 0.022
(1.00)
Political stability -0.713
(0.51)
Income inequality 0.212
(2.01)**
N 70
F 13.38***
R
2
0.756
Adj. R
2
0.699
* Statistically significant at the 10% level
** Statistically significant at the 5% level
* Statistically significant at the 1% level
Absolute t -statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 3. Least square regressions, dependent variable: size of the shadow economy (% of GDP).
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
Const. 42.767 65.882 58.14 69.827 50.339
(2.70)*** (5.17)*** (5.20)*** (10.73)*** (3.64)***
Log of Public education expenditure -1.21 -1.545 -1.867 -1.544
(1.91)* (2.06)** (2.28)** (1.91)*
Expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per capita) 0.053
(0.39)
Expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) -0.01
(0.33)
Primary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.059 0.069 0.063 0.068
(0.56) (0.87) (0.75) (0.82)
Secondary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.07 0.049 0.024 0.045
(0.89) (0.76) (0.35) (0.51)
Higher school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.188 -0.016 -0.063 -0.008
(1.54) (0.16) (0.58) (0.94)
No schooling  (% of population aged 25 and over) -0.148
(1.65)
Average years of total schooling -0.813
(1.35)
Log of GDP per capita -1.937 -4.731 -6.449 -7.585 -3.088
(0.39) (1.45) (1.41) (2.90)*** (0.84)
Direct tax (% of GDP) 0.129 0.058 -0.022 0.066
(0.54) (0.31) (0.11) -0.32
Log of direct tax revenues per capita 2.406
(0.92)
Government effectiveness -5.399 -3.787 -4.59 -4.516
(1.94)* (1.98)* (2.46)** (2.26)**
 Government final consumption expenditure omitting education expenditure(% of GDP) 0.03
(0.15)
Middle income dummy (=1 if country is Middle Income, =0 otherwise) 0.936
(0.30)
Low income dummy (=1 if country is Low Income, =0 otherwise) 1.28
(0.23)
N 54 70 70 70 70
F 20.90*** 28.82*** 23.81*** 20.64*** 17.67***
R
2
0.702 0.7333 0.729 0.699 0.726
Adj. R
2
0.669 0.707 0.698 0.665 0.685
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, ** Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 1% level
Absolute t -statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates.
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Table A1. List of countries.
AUS Australia ARG Argentina BGD Bangladesh
AUT Austria BRA Brazil KHM Cambodia
BEL Belgium BGR Bulgaria KGZ Kyrgyzstan
CAN Canada CHE Chile MLI Mali
HRV Croatia COL Colombia NPL Nepal
CYP Cyprus DOM Dominican Rep. SLE Sierra Leone
CZE Czech Republic EGY Egypt UGA Uganda
DNK Denmark SLV El Salvador
EST Estonia FJI Fiji
FIN Finland GHA Ghana
FRA France GTM Guatemala
DEU Germany IND India
GRC Greece IRN Iran (Islamic Republic of)
HUN Hungary JAM Jamaica
ISL Iceland KAZ Kazakhstan
IRL Ireland LAO Lao PDR
ISR Israel LVA Latvia
ITA Italy LTU Lithuania
JPN Japan MYS Malaysia
PRK Korea, Rep. MDV Maldives
LUX Luxembourg MEX Mexico
MLT Malta MAR Morocco
NLD Netherlands NIC Nicaragua
NZL New Zealand PAK Pakistan
NOR Norway ROM Romania
POL Poland ZAF South Africa
PRT Portugal THA Thailand
SVK Slovak Republic TUR Turkey
SVN Slovenia VEN Venezuela
ESP Spain
SWE Sweden
CHE Switzerland
GBR United  Kingdom 
USA United States
High Income Middle Income Low income
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Table A2. Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average years of total schooling 8.55 2.96 1.16 13.19
Currency outside the banks as a proportion of base money 33.34 13.30 1.60 80.34
Direct tax (% of GDP) 5.84 4.54 0.42 23.20
Expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per capita) 21.97 8.91 2.97 47.74
Expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) 40.76 44.52 5.60 296.52
Government effectiveness 0.56 1.00 -1.36 2.16
Government final consumption expenditure omitting education expenditure(% of GDP) 16.14 5.17 4.07 26.19
Higher school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) 14.33 11.96 0.33 53.05
Income inequality 37.06 9.24 24.00 67.40
Inflation rate 5.40 5.24 -1.74 29.60
Log of direct tax revenues per capita 2.50 0.90 0.50 3.80
Log of GDP per capita 3.85 0.69 2.38 4.91
Log of Public education expenditure 8.08 2.22 4.72 11.82
No schooling  (% of population aged 25 and over) 14.33 18.94 0.00 79.83
Openness (Trade as % of GDP) 86.11 45.53 26.53 286.15
Political stability 0.16 0.91 -2.11 1.59
Primary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) 18.68 12.20 0.19 53.93
Secondary school attained (% of population aged 25 and over) 34.23 22.39 0.77 87.30
Size of the shadow economy (% of GDP) 27.04 10.69 8.50 50.20
Unemployment rate 7.53 4.38 1.30 26.70
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